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Introduction 
The European Union (EU) approaches the end of the century with a heavily loaded agenda; 
and a very important one indeed. In the course of less than two years, important new policy 
decisions are scheduled to be taken, while long-standing commitments will have to undergo 
the difficult test of endurance in European societies and international markets. What happens 
during this short period is likely to influence in a big way the shape of the European construc-
tion for several years to come. Turning points is a much abused term in political parlance; yet 
it could be employed with much justification in the present conjuncture.  
The EU is faced with yet another variation of the now familiar combination (challenge is, 
arguably, a more appropriate term to use) of widening and deepening; and the stakes are 
higher than ever before. Twelve active applications for membership have been waiting at the 
Council's table. They have come from countries with significantly lower levels of economic 
development than those already in and with political systems which can only draw on a 
relatively short (and, in some cases, highly inadequate) experience of parliamentary 
democracy. The further enlargement of the EU to the east and the south is about the 
redrawing of the economic and political map of Europe; and it is also a form of collective 
underwriting of economic prosperity as well peace and security on the European continent.  
The further deepening of European integration as an end in itself, but also as a means of 
preventing the dilution of common policies and the weakening of institutions through the 
accession of new members (an old concern of those already in), is no less important. It is 
centred on economic and monetary union (EMU) scheduled to start on 1 January 1999. But it 
is also about the strengthening of the European political system, and institutional reform in its 
narrower definition. Neither has had much luck at the latest intergovernmental conference 
(IGC) which has delivered very little of substance in this area. Institutional reform and 
political union have therefore been postponed once again, although they have surely not been 
abandoned for ever. Deepening is also about the reform of internal policies, and most notably 
the common agricultural policy (CAP) as well as structural policies, which together account 
for more than 80 per cent of the EU budget.  
In July 1997, the Commission submitted to the Council an important document in which it 
tries to set the main parameters for the development of the Union in the years to come. The 
so-called Agenda 2000 (European Commission, 1997a) sketches with a broad brush the shape 
of a radically reformed CAP; it highlights the main elements of structural policies in an 
enlarged EU; and it outlines the new financial framework extending to the year 2006. Last 
but not least, it proposes a strategy for enlargement, naming the countries which may start 
first what promise to be long and arduous negotiations leading to accession, while also 
proposing ways and means of dealing with those countries which may have to spend an even 
longer time in the waiting room. It is an ambitious document which seems to contain at least 
some of the main elements of a package deal aimed at reconciling widening with deepening. 
It is also a document which clearly tries to take into account the interests of different parties 
as well as the existing balance of power. Since then, things have moved fast. In March 1998, 
the Commission came up with more detailed proposals on the CAP, structural policies and 
the budget, while the accession pro-cess was formally launched with eleven candidate 
countries. This, however, needs to be distinguished from the actual accession negotiations 
which begin with only six countries on the basis of the Commission?s proposals.  
EMU and institutional reform, although essential elements of the overall package linking 
widening with deepening, are not part of Agenda 2000. As far as EMU is concerned, the 
course of action regarding the transition to the final phase and the eventual replacement of 
national currencies by the euro had already been clearly set out. In May 1998, the Council 
selects the countries to become founding members of EMU; it decides on the bilateral 
conversion rates between their currencies; and it also appoints the members of the executive 
board of the European Central Bank (ECB). As for institutional reform, the Commission 
acknowledged the fact that the new Treaty of Amsterdam, which still needs to be ratified, 
falls far short of what will be required for an enlarged Union. It added that the reform of the 
composition and functioning of institutions should precede further enlargement. In other 
words, a new IGC will be needed, according to the Commission, before enlargement takes 
place.  
I propose to discuss below some of the broader issues linked to the Union's main agenda. 
They will be grouped under three headings, namely globalization, equity and legitimacy. 
They are all highly political issues usually camouflaged in official documents under a 
technocratic cloak. The emergence of a stronger and larger EU very much depends on how 
these issues are tackled. They are, of course, highly political issues, despite the fact that the 
specific parts are mostly of an economic nature. This should be hardly surprising. Who says 
that high politics can be divorced from economics in our societies?  
II. Globalization and the European Model 
Globalization has become one of those buzz words of our times. Politicians and journalists, 
economists and sociologists, they all talk about globalization, although they seem to draw 
different theoretical or policy conclusions. When used to draw attention to the considerable 
acceleration of the process of economic internationalization during the recent period, or to the 
benefits to be derived from a more efficient allocation of resources and stronger competition, 
coupled with the constraints imposed on government action, there is arguably little to 
disagree with. When, however, references are made to the ‘global? economy as something 
that already exists, which is also irreversible and economically superior and/or ‘modern? 
(thus implying that markets are always good and governments bad), then globalization 
becomes ideologically loaded, although consistent with prevalent economic orthodoxy. More 
than that perhaps, globalization often serves as a convenient myth or even a scape-goat (Hirst 
and Thompson, 1996:6).  
The external trade of EU-15 in goods (excluding trade between the members of the Union), 
expressed as a percentage of GDP, is now virtually the same as it used to be about 35 years 
ago, namely around 10 per cent. This figure is very similar to the one for the United States. 
Thus, the two biggest trading blocs in the world are still relatively closed economies, as 
anybody might have expected, when in sober mood, given their size. True, member countries 
of the Union have become much more open, but this is almost entirely due to the increase in 
intra-EU trade which now accounts for almost 70 per cent of the total trade of an average EU 
member. The high degree of EU's self-sufficiency in trade terms is expected to increase 
further as a result of enlargement.  
Statistics on merchandise trade are, of course, not the only indicator of economic 
interdependence. In recent years, trade in services has been growing faster than trade in 
goods, although still accounting for approximately one-fifth of total world trade. Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flows have also been growing faster than world trade, thus leading to 
a significant restructuring of world production, especially in services and high technology 
products (Greenaway, 1993; European Commission, 1997b). This has been in turn linked to 
the widespread and rapid diffusion of new technologies accompanied by major institutional 
innovations. Restructuring at the global level also needs to be considered in conjunction with 
the establishment of wide networks and cooperation agreements among firms, covering the 
whole range from research and development to marketing and distribution. The rapid growth 
of trade in intermediate products and intra-company trade is also consistent with the trend 
towards an increasing internationalization of production.  
A similar, although much more pronounced, trend can be observed with respect to financial 
markets. And this is directly linked to the revolution in communications and the rapid 
liberalization of capital movements. Capital, and even more so financial capital, is, of course, 
much more mobile than either goods or labour. Drucker (1997:162) talks about ‘virtual 
money [that] has total mobility because it serves no economic function? And because it 
serves no economic function and finances nothing, this money also does not follow economic 
logic or rationality. It is volatile and easily panicked by a rumor or unexpected event?. Many 
economists would take objection to the alleged lack of economic function of what Drucker 
calls virtual money, although hardly anybody could disagree with the reference to volatility 
and the implied ‘herd instinct? of financial markets.  
In terms of foreign exchange and to a lesser extent bonds, we can perhaps already talk about 
‘global? markets; not yet about stocks, although the links between national markets are 
becoming much stronger with time, as witnessed, for example, during the recent financial 
crisis in East Asian markets and the repercussions felt in the stock exchanges of Western 
industrialized countries; and even less so about retail finance where international integration 
takes place at a more modest pace and mainly through the increasing interconnection of what 
are still national markets. In this respect, global networks are a more common phenomenon 
than global actors.  
The large ongoing restructuring of both the manufacturing sector and financial services in 
Europe, manifested largely through the wave of mergers and acquisitions (many of them 
cross-border), has been in turn linked to liberalization and/or deregulation. Undoubtedly part 
of an international phenomenon, it has not, however, been unaffected by political decisions 
taken at the national and European level. In several policy areas, specific European policy 
answers have been formulated in response to international developments. This applies as 
much to the new ‘regimes? on banking and financial services, as it does to technical standards 
and regulations, not to mention com-petition policy (Tsoukalis, 1997; Pelkmans, 1997).  
The concern expressed about globalization by those who have not been fully converted to the 
new economic orthodoxy (la pensée unique, as referred to by French unbelievers; see also 
Fitoussi, 1995) concentrates usually on the effects of globalization on the state, also raising 
wider issues of governance (which is not confined to state institutions), and the distribution of 
benefits and losses among different groups of society. The two kinds of effects are closely 
linked together.  
During the so-called Golden Age for European economies (Crafts and Toniolo, 1996), which 
lasted until the early 1970s, regional integration was based on a symbiosis between external 
liberalization and the strengthening of the economic role of the state on the domestic level 
(see also Milward, 1992). This was summarized in the phrase ‘Keynes at home and Smith 
abroad?. An important consequence of this symbiotic relationship was that integration was 
essentially limited to trade in goods. It started to break down in the years of stagflation when 
industrial activism and other forms of national economic protectionism opened large holes to 
the European edifice. Later, the internal market programme ushered the EC/EU into a new 
phase which is mainly about the mixed economy.  
The internal market programme has produced some transfer of powers from the nation-state 
to European institutions, although usually different in kind: the emphasis is now on regulation 
and not on direct intervention (Majone, 1996; Tsoukalis and Rhodes, 1997). A two-tier 
regulatory structure has been created in several policy areas, with a sometimes ambiguous 
division of powers between European and national authorities. Yet, there is little doubt that 
the internal market has produced an even more substantial transfer of power from the state to 
the market. This has been much reinforced by inter-national developments, while being 
consistent with the prevailing economic ideology. The weakening of state power has been 
perhaps as much by design as by default. The shift in the balance between the state and the 
market can be at least partly attributed to the weakness of the European political system; 
when the will is there to go beyond negative integration, common instruments prove difficult 
to handle and legitimacy is usually lacking.  
Some observers talk about the ‘restructuring? of the Western European state (Cassese and 
Wright, 1996). Yet, in terms of its traditional economic functions, namely the allocation, 
redistribution and stabilization functions, it is arguably more accurate (and less agnostic) to 
talk about the weakening of the state. In this respect, European integration and international 
developments seem to work in parallel. The strengthening of market forces at the expense of 
state power has generally been welcomed in the name of economic efficiency. Considerations 
about equity and stability have been gradually pushed in the background, although perhaps 
not for good.  
There are important issues which could eventually lead to some reordering of priorities. 
Increasing income inequalities and the crisis of welfare systems in the industrialized world 
are one such example. The instability of financial markets are another, coupled with a 
worrying trend towards the privatization of profits and the socialization of risks (and losses) 
in this sector, as witnessed once again with the official (and IMF) response to the recent 
financial crisis in Asia. The crisis has also raised fears of systemic instability and it has 
produced calls for closer regulation of international financial capital; and some have come 
from rather unexpected sources such as Mr Soros (Financial Times, 31 December 1997/1 
January 1998).  
The symbiosis between external liberalization and different versions of the European mixed 
economy and the welfare state, already mentioned above, had lasted for many years. It had 
been a major characteristic, indeed a precondition, of the long economic boom of the postwar 
period. In more recent years, further liberalization, directly linked to the internal market 
programme and international developments, has been accompanied by a very substantial 
increase in unemployment which seems to be the counterpart to the large increase in income 
inequalities experienced in the United States, and also the UK which has followed the 
American example in terms of labour market deregulation (for recent trends in the dispersion 
of earnings, see European Commission, 1997b; Atkinson, 1996; OECD, 1995).  
The link with liberalization/globalization has been the subject of a vigorous debate in 
academic circles and elsewhere. Some writers have attributed much of the increase in 
unemployment in the EU (and falling relative wages of unskilled workers in the USA) to the 
rapid growth of imports of manufactured goods from developing countries (Wood, 1994). 
Others argue that technological change has played the dominant role in modifying labour 
markets (Cooper, 1994), while still others link, at least in part, the growth of unemployment 
in Europe to restrictive macroeconomic policies coupled with the so-called hysteresis in 
labour markets (CEPR, 1995; Blanchard and Summers, 1986). Most have perhaps 
underestimated the effects of free trade and capital mobility on the relative power of 
governments, owners of capital and labour (close to it comes the argument developed by 
Rodrik, 1997). Power has always been an awkward concept for economists to handle.  
Regional economic integration, and the process of internationalization more generally, 
coupled with technological change, puts a premium on skills and on the flexibility and 
mobility of factors of production. Thus, capital tends to gain more than labour, and 
professionals more than unskilled workers. In the words of Caporaso (1996:44), ‘the 
regionalization of the European economy, guided by the EU, is not a politically innocent 
process?. As Europe (and the process of integration) becomes more and more identified with 
economic liberalization, those who perceive themselves as losers from this process tend to 
rally behind nationalist flags. Some evidence of this can be found in voting patterns and 
opinion polls of recent years, with the French referendum on the Maastricht treaty being one 
of the clearest examples. On the other hand, Euro-sentiments seem to be closely related to the 
economic climate. There is, for instance, a close correlation between annual rates of 
economic growth in the EU and popular support for European unification (Tsoukalis, 1997). 
Love for Europe, even in modest quantities, seems to go first through the pocket of European 
citizens.  
Those who find it difficult to adjust to rapid technological change and economic 
liberalization continue to turn to national institutions, because they simply have nowhere else 
to turn (Judt, 1997). Thus, the ‘nation-state? becomes some kind of a ‘Jesus rail? for the 
losers. Mortimer has a very vivid description: ‘In the bewildering new world the nation-state 
is no longer the engine of modernisation. Instead, it has become the ?Jesus rail? - the handle 
that a white-knuckled passenger clings onto shouting ?Jesus?, as the car he is travelling in 
hurtles round a blind corner? (Financial Times, 6 April 1994).  
However, this ‘Jesus rail? is no longer as effective as it used to be for the protection of 
panicking passengers. The rapid growth of unemployment constitutes a major political, 
economic and social problem in itself. Coupled with demographic trends and the 
accumulation of public debts, it has also put unbearable pressure on European welfare states. 
Inflexible labour markets and too high (only indirect?) labour costs are generally blamed for 
high unemployment. Heavy regulation of these markets is perceived to work against the 
interests of a growing number of ‘outsiders?, mainly women, the young and the unskilled. 
These ‘outsiders? are forced to live of welfare as they are priced out of the labour market, 
because of minimum wages and high indirect costs of labour, and also because of restrictive 
rules on hiring and firing.  
There is a growing consensus among economists on the diagnosis and the therapy proposed, 
the main disagreement now being whether deregulation should go all the way or whether it 
could take place on a piecemeal basis. And this is likely to be gradually reflected in concrete 
policy measures. Under the pressure of high unemployment and the increasingly unaffordable 
cost of welfare payments, European countries are expected to move, some more quickly than 
others, in the direction of deregulated labour markets, thus following the American and 
British examples; and EMU will most probably act as a new and powerful driving force in 
this respect.  
Deregulated labour markets, coupled with technological developments and free trade, will 
mean, however, greater income inequalities. This may finally become accepted by European 
societies as part of the package which also includes liberalization and globalization. Such a 
possibility cannot, of course, be excluded, even though it would have wider political and 
social implications. Assuming that deregulation of labour markets is indeed an one-way 
street, the alternative would be that European governments decide to tackle the problems 
resulting from deregulation without interfering directly with the operation of the labour 
market. Education and training would certainly help the unemployed to adjust to rapidly 
changing demand conditions; but they are not a panacea. Dealing with inequalities, as the 
(inevitable?) product of free markets, would require a major reform of tax and welfare 
policies, including the elimination of tax disincentives for work and a greater concentration of 
welfare policies on those really in need. The welfare state would therefore have to be 
targetted more on poverty and social exclusion, instead of operating largely as a form of 
subsidy for the middle classes through the provision of universal services (Goodin and Le 
Grand, 1987).  
This policy shift would, however, have wider distributional consequences which would not 
all too easily be accepted by the large number of those who would end up losing from it. 
‘Insiders? are much more numerous than ‘outsiders?, and they also have a more powerful 
political voice; hence the strong resistance to change. Thus, a policy shift, such as the one 
described above, would in turn depend on the creation of new political coalitions. The 
dividing line between traditional left and right has become increasingly blurred (Giddens, 
1994). The political forces which call themselves centre-left in some countries, and most 
notably the New Labour in the UK, seem to be moving, even though hesitantly, in this 
direction.  
It goes without saying that the deregulation of labour markets, coupled with major reforms of 
tax and welfare policies, will represent a significant change in what is generally called the 
European social model. The European Com-mission repeatedly refers to the need to preserve 
this model, while at the same time calling for structural reforms in European labour markets 
as a means of safeguarding international competitiveness and tackling unemployment. 
According to the former President of the Commission, Mr Delors, the European construction, 
as also the European model of society, rests on three pillars, namely competition, 
cooperation, and solidarity (Delors, 1994:232).  
This may indeed be so. However, defending and/or adjusting this European model to a 
rapidly changing economic environment is still very much in the hands of national 
governments. In terms of social policies and the regulation of labour markets, subsidiarity 
remains the name of the game, European social charters or no charters. The European labour 
market is highly fragmented, largely because of linguistic and cultural barriers which cannot 
be easily legislated away. Such barriers are, of course, not high enough to stop people driven 
by political fear and economic despair, which is true of many migrants coming from third 
countries. It is not, however, true of intra-EU labour mobility which is still very low.  
European social legislation, although not insignificant, has been mostly about the setting of 
minimum common standards. The Amsterdam treaty has added a new chapter on 
employment, soon followed by a special summit on employment held in November 1997. 
They may create expectations which the Union will have difficulties in fulfilling; although 
this would simply follow the tradition of high rhetoric and little action set by the EU in the 
social field (Tsoukalis, 1997). In terms of employment policies, EU institutions can pro-vide 
a framework for discussion; they can also act as a catalyst and legitimizer of policy measures 
taken at the national level (Koutsiaras, forthcoming). These are not unimportant functions, 
but it is really as far as common institutions can go. Coordination of national employment 
policies, on the basis of multi-annual employment programmes submitted by national 
governments, and multilateral surveillance cannot go further as long as they are not backed 
by hard constraints; and how could they? It will be like the (lack of) coordination of national 
budgetary policies before the adoption of the convergence criteria and EMU. But this is 
arguably not a bad thing, given the wide diversity of economic conditions, including 
productivity rates, rules and institutions, which still characterizes national labour markets in 
Europe.  
Subsidiarity for social and employment policies, yes! Nevertheless, it is also true that the 
further development and deepening of European integration, including most notably EMU, 
will very much depend on the ability of member states to manage economic change, and 
some are bound to be more successful than others. This may sound paradoxical, although it is 
certainly not new. On the other hand, the EU could help to influence the economic 
environment, and in the process make the management of change easier for member 
countries. Some policy options do exist, others may be only theoretical or too costly or both.  
Commercial policy is conducted at the EU level. Yet, trade protectionism is hardly a viable 
option, despite the relatively high degree of self-sufficiency for the Union as a whole. Europe 
cannot and should not try to cut itself off from the process of economic 
globalization/internationalization. The effects of the latter are mainly transmitted through the 
financial markets. There are strong arguments, in the name of stability in large part, militating 
in favour of a closer prudential regulation of financial markets. EMU, and the rapidly 
increased mobility of capital within the euro area which will follow, are bound to raise the 
question of effective regulation for the area as a whole. Uncoordinated national regulatory 
systems will prove grossly inadequate. On the other hand, the EU may tend to adopt, after the 
establishment of monetary union, an attitude of benign neglect with respect to speculative 
movements in financial markets outside the euro area, because of its much reduced 
vulnerability. It would then simply follow the American example. Globalization in financial 
markets provides a powerful argument in favour of EMU.  
There are also the more daring (and unorthodox) among economists who go further by calling 
for the imposition of a small tax on transactions (the so-called Tobin tax) which would raise 
much needed revenue, while also helping to reduce the mobility of short-term speculative 
capital. However, for such measures to work, international cooperation would be necessary; 
and this hardly seems to be forthcoming. Free riders are plenty, while others may need to 
experience more crises before they are convinced about the inherent instability and the 
myopic vision of international financial markets.  
More attention needs to be paid to macroeconomic policy. The time may have come for 
supply-side measures to be complemented with action on the macroeconomic front, which 
would be intended to stimulate demand. The EU can provide the framework for coordinated 
action in this area, especially if/when the current economic recovery begins to recede, 
independently or not of the Asian adjustment. Reflationary measures will only be possible, if 
they are coordinated at the EU level; and this will become easier with EMU. Admittedly, 
such action would not be consistent with the prevailing economic orthodoxy; and even talk of 
reflationary measures could ignite the fears of many stability-minded Germans (and others) 
about EMU. The persistence of high unemployment, coupled with the difficulties and 
limitations of supply-side measures, may help to change attitudes before not too long. 
Otherwise, we will end up with too narrow an implementation of the stability and growth 
pact, thus concentrating exclusively on stability which is also the only con-straining part of 
the pact. And this would have negative consequences for the real economy, including the 
level of unemployment.  
III. Equity and Redistribution 
Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome referred to the objective of a ‘harmonious development of 
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion?, while in the preamble the 
contracting parties went even further by calling for a reduction of ‘the differences between 
the various regions and the backward-ness of the less favoured regions?. There were, 
however, very few provisions in the treaty for the creation of instruments which could 
contribute towards this ‘harmonious development? and the reduction of regional disparities.  
The original European package deal made little room for explicit redistributive instruments 
on an inter-country basis. It was too early for that. Instead, the highly complicated package 
designed by the founders was meant precisely to bring about a fairly equal distribution of 
gains and losses among member countries; and this is what really counted at the time. As for 
internal distribution, it was left to national governments to care about.  
Redistributive instruments at the European level have been developed in relation to 
successive rounds of widening and deepening. The EC/EU has become bigger, with wider 
economic disparities. Meanwhile, new liberalization measures, such as the internal market 
programme, and the decision to proceed to an EMU, which means abandoning an important 
adjustment instrument at the national level, are leading to a qualitatively new phase of 
economic integration. They have been accompanied with bigger transfers to the weaker 
countries and regions. As a means of enabling the latter to take better advantage of the 
internal market and EMU, or rather as a more or less crude way of buying off potential 
opposition? Perhaps, intentions do not really matter much; what counts are results.  
The crucial turning point came in 1988, following the adoption of the Single European Act, 
when a substantial reform of the Structural Funds was combined with the doubling of the 
resources available. The Maastricht revision of the treaties, containing most importantly the 
provision for the creation of EMU, offered almost a repetition of the same story, thus 
reinforcing the link between further economic integration on the one hand and redistribution 
and cohesion (now an established term in the European vocabulary) on the other.  
Structural policies constitute the most important redistributive instrument at the EU level. 
They represent approximately 35 per cent of the budget and most of that money goes to the 
less developed countries and regions (with GDP of less than 75 per cent of the EU average). 
Net annual transfers to Greece, Ireland and Portugal usually exceed 3 per cent of their 
respective GDP, while the corresponding figure for Spain, the fourth member of the so-called 
cohesion group, is smaller. Structural policies are therefore no longer a cosmetic exercise; 
and they have a real economic effect on those who are on the receiving end, even though EU 
programmes often leave considerable room for improvement in terms of economic efficiency 
(European Commission, 1997c; Begg, Gudgin, and Morris, 1995).  
On an inter-country and inter-regional basis, EU transfers are already quite substantial, 
although still far below the corresponding transfers inside member countries. For the Eastern 
Länder, admittedly a rather extreme example, annual budgetary transfers corresponded for 
several years following German unification to more than 50 per cent(!) of their per capita 
income; and the cur-rent figures are still not far below. So much for the German trust in 
market forces as a means of dealing with regional disparities.  
The emphasis of EU structural policies remains on the reduction of inter-country and inter-
regional disparities, concentrating on investment, while national policies and welfare systems 
are meant to take care of inter-personal disparities, including the subsidization of incomes 
and consumption. Indirectly, EU structural policies do have an effect on income distribution 
inside countries and regions, but this is not meant to be their main function. Other EU 
policies, and especially the CAP, also have some redistributive effect; and in the case of the 
CAP, with a significant regressive dimension in terms of inter-personal disparities (Tarditi 
and Zanias, forthcoming). Even after the reform, European taxpayers will most likely 
continue to pay for generous subsidies which go mainly to large landowners; and all this will 
be happening in the name of social justice and the protection of rural life!  
Does market integration lead to the widening of disparities? This has always been one of the 
key questions in international trade theory, and not only. Regional integration schemes in 
other parts of the world have often foundered precisely because of the failure to deal 
effectively with the problem of equitable distribution of gains and losses among participants. 
Since equity and redistribution have been central elements of the European mixed economy 
at the national level, it would have been very surprising if this had not become increasingly 
true of the EU as well. In my student days, theories of centre and periphery, which were 
particularly popular among the left-leaning members of the academic profession, predicted 
the widening of disparities as a result of integration, especially since the EC-9 at the time was 
preparing to take in the economically less developed countries of the European South (Seers, 
Schaffer and Kiljunen, 1979; for a more recent and different account, see Bliss and Braga de 
Macedo, 1990). New theories of international economics and regional economics, which 
place the emphasis on economies of scale, imperfect competition, differentiated products and 
innovation, at least do not find either any strong reasons to expect the elimination of 
regional/country problems through the free interplay of market forces (Krugman, 1986).  
The European experience until now has been mildly encouraging. There seems to be a 
positive correlation between economic growth and the reduction of inter-country and inter-
regional income disparities inside the EC/EU. They were reduced during the boom years of 
the 1960s and early 1970s. The trend was reversed during the long recession which followed, 
and then again growth rates in the less developed countries picked up during the second half 
of the 1980s (European Commission, 1997c). During the more recent period, when the 
implementation of the internal market programme coincided with the operation of Structural 
Funds, less developed countries and regions of the EU have tended to grow faster than the 
EU average, thus contributing to greater economic cohesion. There is naturally a whole range 
of different economic performances hidden behind this general statement: from the 
spectacular growth of the Republic of Ireland to the relative stagnation of the Mezzo-giorno 
and Northern Ireland. EU redistributive instruments have contributed to this generally 
positive performance of the less developed countries and regions; but they have not been the 
only, and often not even the most decisive, factor. For example, FDI inflows into Ireland 
were for several years a multiple of transfers through the Structural Funds.  
The basic operating rules of the Structural Funds, the total sums of money involved, and their 
distribution have been decided for the period extending until the end of the decade. Important 
decisions will therefore need to be taken before the end of 1999 about the future direction of 
EU structural policies; and those decisions will have an important effect for EMU and further 
enlargement. What kind of redistributive mechanisms, and of what size, will be needed in the 
context of a monetary union; and what kind of structural policies in an enlarged Union where 
the new members will have income levels which are only a fraction of that of the poorest 
member of the EU of Fifteen?  
Will there be a further large increase in the total amounts spent or will the present 
beneficiaries accept a substantial reduction of EU transfers in order to allow a reallocation of 
funds in favour of the new members? Will the goal-posts (for example, the 75 per cent GDP 
indicator for the less developed countries and regions which are now the main beneficiaries) 
be shifted in order to adjust for the increased number of players? Here there is also a problem 
of moral hazard: should the least successful among the existing players be allowed to stay in 
the game, while the better performers (such as Ireland) are taken off the field? Should more 
emphasis be placed on innovative policies rather than simply throwing money at problems, 
which is the way EU structural policies are viewed by some of the net contributors to the 
budget? And should conditionality be strengthened, not only in terms of the macroeconomic 
policies pursued by the recipient countries but also in terms of efficiency in the use of the 
resources made available to them through the Structural Funds? These are some of the 
questions which will require political answers before the EU enters into a new phase of 
integration.  
Delivering politically acceptable answers will be mostly an exercise in reconciling the 
interests of the North, the South and the East; in other words, reconciling the interests of 
major contributors to the EU budget, and most notably Germany which is by far the biggest 
net contributor in both absolute and relative amounts (expressed as a percentage of GDP); the 
present beneficiaries from EU structural policies, including Ireland as an honourary (for how 
long?) Southern member; and those waiting outside to join the feast. The Agenda 2000 
constitutes the first, albeit highly ingenuous, attempt made by the Commission to sketch the 
broad outlines of such a compromise. The proposals submitted in March 1998 go further in 
this direction.  
To Germany and the other net contributors, the Commission offers the unchanged upper 
ceiling of own resources which is therefore proposed to remain at 1.27 per cent of the Union's 
GNP. Thus, additional real resources for structural policies and EU expenditure in general 
should come only from whatever margin will have been left in 1999 in relation to the above 
ceiling adopted at Maastricht and through the resources created by new economic growth. 
The Commission's forecast for the period until 2006 is for an annual growth rate of 2.5 per 
cent for the Fifteen and 4 per cent for the applicant countries. Based on the experience of the 
1990s, this forecast leans on the optimistic side, although it may not be completely 
unrealistic. Given the sensitivity of the issue and the need to make commitments which will 
extend over a period of seven years, it can be fairly safely predicted that the real negotiations 
on overall sums for the EU budget for the period after 1999 will not start before German 
federal elections scheduled for September 1998. The paymaster of Europe now appears less 
willing to dig in his/her collective pockets.  
On the basis of the above assumptions, and also assuming that the EU structural policies will 
continue to represent 0.46 per cent of the Union's GNP, the Commission has estimated that 
there will be a total amount of ECU 275 billion (at 1997 prices) for structural operations, 
under the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, for the period 2000-2006, as compared 
with ECU 200 billion for 1993-1999. The Commission proposes to spend 210 bil-lion for the 
existing members through the Structural Funds, while 45 billion will be earmarked for the 
new members, expected to join some time before the end of the period (2000-2006), and 
including 7 billion in the form of pre-accession aid for all the candidates. The remaining 
amount will be spent through the Cohesion Fund. The Commission also proposes a greater 
concentration of resources, by reducing the percentage of the population of the Union eligible 
for structural aid, a simplification of the objectives used, and a gradual phasing out of 
structural aid given to those countries and regions which, precisely because of having done 
well, should no longer qualify under the GDP criterion (below 75 per cent of the EU 
average). The latter is meant to deal mainly with the problem(?) of Ireland which continues to 
register very high rates of growth.  
In view of the much lower level of economic development of the candidate countries, the 
proposed distribution between present and future beneficiaries of structural policies may 
sound rather surprising. It is based on the following reasoning: first, the Commission assumes 
that the first round of enlargement will not take place before the year 2002 (which may in the 
end prove to be an optimistic target); second, it assumes that there will be a gradual phasing 
in of new members in terms of common policies, including their access to funds; and third, it 
sets a ceiling for transfers through structural aid at 4 per cent of GDP for each country, which 
is in turn justified in terms of the capacity of beneficiary countries to absorb efficiently and 
also to match EU funds with their own funds.  
The figure of 4 per cent, like any other figure in this case, is, of course, entirely arbitrary; but 
it is also crucial for the Commission's calculations. It happens to be close to the figure 
representing current flows to the poorest countries of EU-15, which in turn means that, if 
adopted, the absolute amounts to be transferred in the future to the new members will be 
significantly smaller because of their lower levels of GDP per capita. A question of 
absorptive capacity, for sure. But it can also serve as further confirmation of the old maxim of 
political behaviour: ‘Blessed are those who have a seat around the table?.  
There will be, undoubtedly, long and difficult negotiations before any agreement can be 
reached on the new financial framework, including the overall ceiling for revenue and the 
specific items of expenditure, of which structural operations are the second biggest, after the 
CAP. Blessedly, the habit of multi-annual agreements on the EU budget, and also structural 
policies, has now become firmly established, thus sparing the Union of the annual ritual of 
budgetary battles which used to paralyze the old Community in the not too distant past, while 
also allowing for some medium-term planning which is not always bad for public health.  
The Commission's proposals seem to provide a realistic basis (is it also equitable?) for the 
launching of negotiations at the Council level. There are, however, some important and yet 
unanswered questions. Is it realistic to argue that no major changes will be required for the 
Union budget in the context of EMU and further enlargement? Such an argument, of course, 
avoids opening the Pandora's box about own resources and new taxes, rebates and net contri-
butions, not to mention the subject of new expenditures in times of fiscal consolidation. But 
can it work in the medium and long run? With low labour mobility, limited flexibility of 
labour markets, and small budgetary transfers, is EMU economically viable?  
And if the economic and political integration of candidate countries in the European system is 
indeed meant as a high priority of the EU as a whole, can this be realistically achieved with 
transfers which will only begin to have an impact several years ahead and only for those 
lucky enough to make it to Brussels before the year 2006? Countries like Bulgaria and 
Romania would have to wait very long before their economies can benefit on any significant 
scale from EU structural assistance. The provision for pre-accession aid for all candidate 
countries certainly constitutes a step forward in comparison with the much smaller sums of 
money spent until now, mostly on technical assistance, under the PHARE programme. But is 
it all the EU can deliver? The kind of overall policy on enlargement proposed by the 
Commission runs the risk of contributing to the further widening of the gap which already 
separates different groups of European countries.  
There is yet another important question which links with the discussion on globalization and 
liberalization. Redistributive instruments at the European level will continue to concentrate 
on inter-country and inter-regional disparities; perhaps with a sense of realism, since welfare 
policies have always been an important part of state-building. But will member governments 
prove able to compensate, retrain or reemploy the significant number of losers in this period 
of rapid economic restructuring? And if not, what consequences would the political and 
social reaction of the losers, or potential losers, have on the momentum of European 
integration?  
IV. The Legitimacy Deficit 
The gap between economic and political integration has been constantly growing wider. 
Economic issues have become increasingly European and international under the influence of 
autonomous market forces, technological change, and the lowering of barriers. Yet, politics 
remains predominantly national and the political discourse generally implies that national 
units are much more independent economically than they actually are. Symbols and public 
money are still very much in the hands of national governments and this largely determines 
the direction of loyalties and expectations of their citizens. But there is also a clear time-lag 
in the perception of change by large sections of the national political elites and the public at 
large. National political dis-course often has a striking sense of unreality.  
Malinvaud (1989: 374) has argued that ‘achieving European unification while maintaining 
national autonomy? is like a tragedy in the spirit of Corneille. National governments, together 
with their citizens, have been the main protagonists in a tragedy which is more and more 
about the expectations gap in terms of what national governments can actually deliver. The 
latter have proved increasingly unable to deliver the same quality of goods to which their 
citizens had become accustomed: steady growth, effective solidarity mechanisms for the 
reduction of inequalities, insurance against risks, and a wide collection of public goods. 
These are all functions which European states acquired during the long period of economic 
boom after the Second World War. And they were added to the more traditional functions of 
the state, such as the provision of security as well as acting as the embodiment of national 
identity.  
This increasing difficulty in delivering the economic goods is, of course, directly related to 
the weakening of state control over the national economy coupled with rapid changes in the 
international economic environment. In the words of Streeck (1996: 312), ‘As the gap 
between formal and effective sovereignty widens and the purchasing power of national 
citizenship deteriorates ? popular beliefs in the lasting efficacy of national democracy are 
bound to give rise to distorted expressions of collective preferences, perverse political 
alliances and self-defeating definitions of interest?. Populism and xenophobia would then be 
just around the corner. Assuming that the change in the relation between the state and the 
market is of a more permanent nature, then this will require a corresponding change in the 
political discourse, accompanied by some adjustment in popular expectations. It will also 
require policy reforms and a realignment of political forces, which may be just beginning.  
On the other hand, European integration had for long been largely an affair of elites, while 
relying on some kind of wider permissive consensus. ‘Enlightened administration on behalf 
of uninformed publics, in cooperation with affected interests and subject to the approval of 
national governments? is how W.Wallace and Smith (1995:143) describe the initial 
compromise which for many years subsequently provided the political foundations of the 
European construction. These foundations no longer seem particularly solid; and this became, 
for the first time, painfully obvious during the ratification of the Maastricht treaty. Things 
have not really improved since then.  
The rapid expansion of the European agenda, coupled with the progressive deterioration of 
the economic environment, has brought with it what can be called a crisis of legitimacy in the 
EU (Dehousse, 1995). Regional integration now covers a very wide range of issues and 
policy areas, thus also having a direct impact on an increasing number of citizens. Usually 
covered in their technocratic cloak, European issues remain out of bounds for the ordinary 
citizen. Furthermore, Europe tends more and more to be identified with rapid change which is 
in turn perceived by many people (and often rightly so) as an immediate threat. Under these 
circustances, popular support (even in the form of permissive consensus) for further 
European integration is bound to suffer.  
Although admittedly affected by the adverse economic climate and the meteoric rise of 
unemployment in the 1990s, the rather lukewarm popular support for EMU, as registered in 
the regular surveys of public opinion published by Eurobarometer, is perhaps indicative of 
this new state of affairs. On this important issue, Southern Europe appears to be generally 
more sympathetic, but also less informed, while sizeable negative majorities are registered in 
several member countries, including Germany and the UK. Surely, public opinion can easily 
swing either way; and a successful EMU, coupled with a more favourable economic 
environment, should be a most convincing argument. But will it be so?  
European monetary union will operate within a highly decentralized political system and with 
a highly decentralized fiscal policy. The latter will remain essentially a national 
responsibility, with a further high degree of decentralization in the case of federal political 
systems within the Union, while a system of constraints and economic sanctions has been 
provided for, through the treaty and subsequently through the adoption of the stability and 
growth pact, in order to deal with large national deficits. The combination described above 
will not be easily sustainable.  
Monetary policy will be transferred to the ECB which will be independent and largely 
unaccountable. Since the ECB will have no history and reputation to rely upon, there is a 
strong possibility that the newly appointed European central bankers will try to gain 
credibility for the ECB in the markets by leaning on the restrictive side of monetary policy. 
This is precisely the contrary of fears often expressed in the financial press about a weak 
euro. Although hardly anybody would doubt the value of price stability (the real question is 
how much and what, if any, is the trade-off), the greater emphasis placed on it in recent years 
may also have something to do with demography and more precisely with the increasingly 
ageing populations and the rentier culture associated with this phenomenon. Retired people 
need stable prices more than others in order to protect their savings and their pensions. Price 
stability is in turn linked directly to the independence of monetary institutions, which means 
independence from political control. For many countries, EMU thus implies a double transfer 
of power: from the national to the European level and from politicians to technocrats, thus 
following the precedent set by the Bundesbank, although actually going even further because 
of the weakness of the European political system, which in turn means weak political 
account-ability of the ECB.  
Here lie some fundamental political questions. How much economic policy should remain in 
the hands of elected representatives? This question is, of course, not confined to the EU level. 
And can there be a central bank without a corresponding political authority? This is, indeed, a 
question specific to the EU. There is hardly any historical precedent for that. What will be the 
political reactions if and when the ECB takes decisions which may be widely perceived (even 
erroneously, according to some economists) as having a direct impact on unemployment in 
Lille, Naples or Athens ? Who will people demonstrate against in the streets? The so-called 
faceless technocrats in Frankfurt? German values and history are not automatically 
exportable to other European countries. There is also a more general question of legitimacy 
which is not yet for sale in the European market-place. A newly independent Banque de 
France, for example, can always draw on the reservoir of legitimacy of the French state in the 
conduct of national monetary policy. But there is no equivalent as yet at the European level.  
Provisions made for the operation of the economic arm of EMU are not likely to make things 
easier. The long experience of fiscal laxity in some European countries and the evident 
inability of financial markets to act as effective and efficient constraints on sovereign actors 
have been used as arguments in favour of some central discipline on national deficit 
financing. The relevant treaty provisions and subsequent decisions by the Council are aimed 
essentially against ‘free riders? in the context of monetary union. Their effectiveness in 
political terms remains to be tested. But this is far from the whole story. The stability and 
growth pact may end up imposing too much rigidity on national fiscal policies, while on the 
contrary, more flexibility may be needed inside a monetary union. When most founding 
members of EMU will be starting with public deficits at or close to 3 per cent of GDP in the 
upswing of the business cycle, the provisions of the pact will leave little room for the 
operation of the so-called automatic stabilizers at the national level. This may be translated 
into more unemployment when the European economy goes on the downswing.  
At the European level, what is at stake is about who and how will determine the 
macroeconomic priorities for the EU as a whole, assuming, of course, that there is still such a 
function to perform for elected representatives. And there is as yet no mechanism for this. 
The EU budget is very small and with no provision for a stabilization function. On the other 
hand, the present system of policy coordination cannot be expected to deliver the goods. The 
broad guide-lines adopted by ECOFIN every year are likely to remain too broad to have any 
real effect on national economic policies. This means that the future European economic 
system will tend to be ‘under-stabilized? against both common and asymmetric shocks 
(Allsop, Davies and Vines, 1995). Do we expect the whole burden of internal adjustment to 
fall on our still highly inflexible labour markets? And how much flexibility of this kind are 
European political systems likely to deliver in the near future? These are, of course, meant as 
largely rhetorical questions.  
The latest IGC, formally concluded in Amsterdam in June 1997, had been called to deal with 
the unfinished business of political union left by the drafters of the Maastricht treaty. The 
Germans had been entirely logical in insisting on a close link between EMU and political 
union. They did not, however, remain consistent until the end for their own domestic reasons. 
The meagre results of the new Amsterdam treaty suggest that the business of political union 
will remain very much unfinished even after the establishment of EMU; and most probably, 
at least until the next round of enlargement. On the other hand, it is highly doubtful whether 
the kind of institutional reform discussed during the latest IGC would have helped much to 
deal with the legitimacy problem described above. Would, for example, the change in the 
number of Commissioners and the reweighting of votes as well as the extension of majority 
voting in the Council of Ministers make decisions of the ECB (and lack of decisions of the 
Council for that matter) more legitimate in the eyes of European citizens?  
The French have, instead, concentrated their efforts on the creation of a strong political 
counterpart to the ECB, un pôle économique, which has finally taken the shape of the newly-
formed (and much disliked by those who will remain outside) Euro-X Council. French policy 
rests on the assumption that the strengthening of intergovernmental organs, and hence state 
(or indirect) legitimacy within the EU, would be an adequate way of dealing with an 
independent ECB. In any case, their conversion to the principle of independence of the 
central bank is very recent and perhaps only half-hearted (this is precisely what many 
Germans, and others, suspect).  
French policy on the inter-institutional balance inside the EU, and also indirectly on the 
question of legitimacy of European institutions, has been at least consistent all along. 
However, the fundamental premise on which it rests has become increasingly questionable. Is 
indirect legitimacy (H.Wallace, 1993), emanating from the states which constitute the Union, 
really sufficient for the stage of integration we have reached? This would be more 
questionable, and even inconsistent, if at the same time we were to accept that, in an enlarged 
EU, intergovernmental institutions (call me Council) will have to resort more to (qualified) 
majority voting, irrespective of whether there is a reweighting of national votes or not.  
Plans for political union (the term union covers a very wide range in terms of the intensity of 
the link to be established in this polygamous affair) invariably include proposals for a further 
strengthening of the powers of the directly elected European Parliament. Both the Maastricht 
and now the Amsterdam treaties include some transfer of additional powers to the Parliament. 
The direct legitimation of the EU, as one of the two pillars (the other being state legitimacy) 
on which the European construction will have to rest, necessarily goes through the 
strengthening of the powers of elected representatives of the European peoples. The Union 
will need to go further along this road, although always bearing in mind that the EU is not 
and will most probably not become for a long time like its national constituent units; hence 
the need for innovative solutions.  
The transfer of additional powers to the European Parliament (like, for example, the power of 
electing the President of the Commission?) may not be enough. Some such transfer, although 
arguably inadequate, has already taken place, and yet the real power (and influence) of the 
European Parliament leaves a great deal to be desired. Political parties, still very much 
national in their outlook and internal organization, have largely failed until now to act as two-
way transmission belts between European institutions and the ordinary citizen, while 
transnational party organizations remain loose coalitions. Not surprisingly, election 
campaigns for the European Parliament have always been dominated by national issues; and 
there is still precious little public debate about Europe-wide issues.  
All this refers back to the gap between economic reality and political perception. It seems 
therefore that the legitimacy deficit of the EU is something much wider than the often 
repeated democratic deficit which relates to the limited powers of the European Parliament. 
Can we have democracy without a demos; and is it mainly a question of time for a shared 
European identity to develop? These are big questions generally left out of official 
documents, but which naturally attract much more attention from academics (Laffan, 1996; 
Weiler, 1997).  
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, some of the main items of the Union’s current long agenda have been used as a 
starting point for the discussion of broader issues which, having lurked for long in the 
background, are now coming rapidly into the open as European integration enters a new and 
qualitatively different phase.  
Globalization is often used as an excuse for policy inaction. It is crude economic determinism 
to argue that the process of internationalization of economic forces, reinforced by 
technological developments, leaves no room for political choices. Politics cannot be replaced 
by the market, although the latter does impose constraints, while also offering opportunities. 
The process of what is generally called globalization has an important effect on labour mar-
kets and welfare policies, which is precisely where European societies have differentiated 
themselves most from other advanced industrialized countries. This in turn raises the question 
of the survival and/or adjustment of the European economic and social model.  
This is a question mainly addressed to national political systems; the role of the EU still being 
limited to the provision of a forum for discussion, while occasionally acting also as a catalyst, 
a legitimizer or even a scapegoat for unpopular decisions taken at the national level. What 
may appear as a paradox, however, given this limited role of common institutions, is that the 
future of European integration largely depends on whether this problem can be successfully 
tackled by member countries. The new social question in Europe, manifesting itself in terms 
of high unemployment, growing inequalities and exclusion, threatens political and social 
stability at home. It also threatens the further deepening of regional integration. Thus, we 
come back once again to the old symbiotic relationship between the Union and its member 
states: a strong EU needs strong states and vice versa. The terms of this symbiotic 
relationship need, however, to be redefined in a different economic and political context.  
Equity and redistribution form an integral part of the European package, both at the national 
and the EU level. The change in the economic environment requires a redefinition of the 
package at the national level, a process which is only just beginning in some countries. As 
regards the Union, two different kinds of questions arise in this respect: first, whether it 
should gradually acquire some role in terms of inter-personal redistribution and welfare 
payments as a means of compensating losers from economic liberalization; and second, 
whether anything more can be done for the countries which may be waiting rather long 
before they are allowed to cross the gates of paradise in Brussels.  
On the first question, the change from the status quo may prove to be very slow, thus leaving 
the old division of labour between national governments and European institutions virtually 
untouched. We should at least begin to think about it. On the second question, member 
governments and EU institutions still refuse to put their money (and their policies) where 
their mouth is. In view of the enormous challenge created by the collapse of communist 
regimes and the end of the cold war in Europe, the policy response of the EU and its member 
governments until now has been characterized by lack of generosity and imagination. The 
Agenda 2000 and subsequent proposals made by the Commission constitute a step forward, 
although arguably still not big enough. If the EU cannot be a global power, it should at least 
be able to play an important regional role by contributing to economic prosperity as well as 
peace and stability on the European continent.  
Deepening has been given precedence over enlargement; and EMU will dominate the 
European agenda for several years, thus also determining the overall shape of the Union. The 
climate has changed dramatically in recent years: there is now little doubt that EMU will 
happen and on time. The only real question is how to make EMU successful. It is no 
exaggeration to argue that EMU is both an exercise in high politics and a high risk exercise. 
Its suc-cess will depend on the continuous interaction between governments, societies and 
markets. In other words, it will depend on whether fiscal policies, labour markets and 
political systems in general are able to adjust to the exigencies of a centralized monetary 
policy and a single currency in the context of increasingly global financial markets.  
In recent years, national macroeconomic policies in Europe have been determined by the 
need to comply with the convergence criteria. Luckily, the last and most difficult part of this 
long race, before the crucial May 1998 decisions, has been taking place in favourable 
conditions created by an externally driven economic recovery. This may not last for long. The 
viability of EMU very much depends on whether both the economic arm and political union 
will follow the monetary lead, even though the existing treaty is very modest on both fronts. 
A successful EMU will necessitate major structural reforms in member countries, which will 
cause pain and thus provoke resistance. They will be made much easier under conditions of 
healthy economic growth. There is scope for macroeconomic policy to influence aggregate 
demand, especially if such action is taken jointly by European governments; and this should 
be made easier by EMU.  
The success of EMU will require a closer and more effective coordination (not centralization) 
of national fiscal policies, and eventually a bigger EU bud-get with a stabilization and 
redistribution function. Last but not least, it will require a European political system in which 
common issues are properly debated and in which there is stronger direct legitimation of 
European institutions and policies. The ECB will not be able to operate in a political vacuum; 
and neither the intergovernmental Council nor the directly elected Parliament in its present 
form can fill it adequately.  
The latest IGC has offered a rather depressing spectacle of disunity and collective lack of 
vision. Perhaps, it came too soon after Maastricht. Perhaps, it also lacked the strong 
leadership which had characterized previous treaty revisions. Many different explanations 
can be offered for its striking failure. Yet, EMU is scheduled to happen very soon and 
successive rounds of enlargement are supposed to follow. It is highly doubtful whether the 
present European system and its constituent units will be able to sustain the pressure resulting 
from both. We need institutions and policies at the European, national and infranational level 
which challenge conventional wisdom; in other words, new forms of governance in a 
dynamic environment. Europe has delivered before, and with much success. Old models do, 
however, need to adjust when the world around changes so fast.  
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